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ARTICLES

Tenure:
A
Summary

Explanation,
and

"Defense"

William Van Alstyne

I. Introduction
In the wake of student unrest and in the presence of
strong competition for the diversion of funds to other
national priorities, severe demands are now being made
for greater professional accountability and for greater
efficiency in higher education. Unsurprisingly, tenure has
been singled out as an obstacle to both of these goals and,
consequently, as a blockade to educational progress.
Simultaneously, the felt dissatisfaction with the general
adequacy of teaching has renewed the common suspicion
that tenure is a professional masquerade: that it lingers
as a sophistical phrase obscuring the dark reality of
uniquely selfish claims of a right to lifetime employment
for the incompetent and irresponsible.
Older members of the profession may well be inclined
to shrug off these critical suggestions, having heard them
more than once before and remembering the careful
answers that ably replied to them. (It is in fact quite true
that the issue has been joined many times, i.e., that the
concept of tenure has never been allowed to pass unexamined, simply as part of the conventional wisdom.)
Nevertheless, even if it is true that little new can possibly
be said on the subject, some brief reconsideration may
serve at least to rekindle a livelier understanding of a vital
concept which has tended of late to suffer from a hardening of the categories.
In this small essay, I mean hardly to offer a "defense"
of tenure at all. Rather, given the presuppositious character of criticism so recently heaped upon it, tenure's best
defense may well inhere simply in a clear statement of
what it is- and what it is not. In what follows, I believe
that the statements about tenure are fully responsive to the
applicable principles and standards supported by AAUP,
although there is certainly nothing more authoritative
about my views in this regard than those of others to
whom the Bulletin freely extends the courtesy of its pages.
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE is Professor of Law at Duke
University. He is the immediate past General Counsel of
the AAUP and is currently Chairman of Committee A on
Academic Freedom and Tenure.
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II. A Summary,
and"Defense"
Explanation,
Tenure, accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no
claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment.
Rather, tenure provides only that no person continuously
retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified
lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be
dismissed without adequate cause. Moreover, the particular standards of "adequate cause" to which the tenured
faculty is accountable are themselves wholly within the
prerogative of each university to determine through its
own published rules, save only that those rules not be
applied in a manner which violates the academic freedom
or the ordinary personal civil liberties of the individual.
An institution may provide for dismissal for "adequate
cause" arising from failure to meet a specified norm of
performance or productivity, as well as from specified acts
of affirmative misconduct. In short, there is not now and
never has been a claim that tenure insulates any faculty
member from a fair accounting of his professional responsibilities within the institution which counts upon his
service.
In a practical sense, tenure is translatable principally as
a statement of formal assurance that thereafter the individual's professional security and academic freedom will
not be placed in question without the observance of full
academic due process. This accompanying complement
of academic due process merely establishes that a fairly
rigorous procedure will be observed whenever formal
complaint is made that dismissal is justified on some stated
ground of professional irresponsibility, to insure the fair
determination of three facts:
1. that the stated cause is the authentic cause for dismissal, rather than a pretense or makeweight for considerations invading the academic freedom or ordinary personal
civil liberties of the individual;
2. that the stated cause exists in fact;
3. that the degree of demonstrated professional irresponsibility warrants outright termination of the individual's appointment rather than some lesser sanction, even
after taking into account the balance of his entire service
and the personal consequences of dismissal.
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In all of these respects, the procedural protections of
tenure are analogous to fair hearing requirements even
now evolving in the federal courts for the protection of
various kinds of status in the public sector (including
employment), to the statutory procedural protection of
civil servants, and to the grievance procedures conventional in collective bargaining agreements. It has long
since ceased to be true that even relatively unskilled
workers in an industrial firm may be summarily fired by
unilateral decision of management; statutory law limits
the grounds for dismissal, recourse to the National Labor
Relations Board is available for reinstatement and back
pay under appropriate circumstances, and the contract
itself ordinarily provides for a grievance procedure for
review and arbitration of the proposed discharge. (Tenure
- through its reference to more specific and rigorous
forms of academic due process- usually does provide,
however, a larger measure of procedural protection than
is provided in the ex post facto review of the factory
worker's grievance.)
Tenure may also be stated in the following way more
clearly to indicate its basis and meaning. The conferral
of tenure means that the institution, after utilizing a probationary period of as long as six years in which it has
had ample opportunity to determine the professional competence and responsibility of its appointees, has rendered
a favorable judgment establishing a rebuttable presumption of the individual's professional excellence. As the
lengthy term of probationary service will have provided
the institution with sufficient experience to determine
whether the faculty member is worthy of a presumption
of professional fitness, it has not seemed unreasonable to
shift to the individual the benefit of doubt when the institution thereafter extends his service beyond the period of
probation and, correspondingly, to shift to the institution
the obligation fairly to show why, if at all, that faculty
member should nonetheless be fired. The presumption of
the tenured faculty member's professional excellence thus
remains rebuttable, exactly to the extent that when it can
be shown that the individual possessing tenure has nonetheless fallen short or has otherwise misconducted himself
as determined according to full academic due process, the
presumption is lost and the individual is subject to dismissal.
There are, moreover, certain circumstances in which
tenure will not provide even this degree of professional
security for faculty members of unquestioned excellence.
Two of these circumstances may appropriately be specified to indicate further how utterly false is the claim that
tenure would rather suffer hardship to an entire institution
than hardship to any of its tenured staff. As many faculty
members are painfully aware, declining student enrollments in certain academic departments not only have occurred with such suddenness as to raise a serious question
of whether the decline is really a healthy turning away
from less worthwhile subjects (rather than a simple turn
of fashion), but have also precipitously reduced the demand for the services of some faculty members with particular skills in those departments. Nevertheless, assum-
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ing that each of the affected faculty members, even
though he possesses tenure, is either unable or unwilling
to retrain and equip himself to be professionally competent in some other area of the academic program with
sufficient demand to sustain his employment within the
institution, his services may be terminated simply by the
cessation of the program itself. While the faculty appropriately must participate in any decision concerning the
reduction or elimination of a given program for the same
reason that it must do so when the enlargement or addition of a program may be contemplated, viz., to provide
some informed judgment about the educational wisdom
of the proposed programmatic change, tenure provides no
guarantee against becoming a casualty to institutional
change.
Again, the termination of particular academic programs,
not from failure of interest by students but from unavoidable conditions of financial stringency, carries with it no
suggestion that the released members of the faculty have
either fallen short in their duties or otherwise misconducted themselves in a manner warranting termination.
Nonetheless, if there is an authentic financial emergency
confronting the university, and if decisions concerning
what programs must be terminated and in what order,
what particular faculty members must be released and in
what sequence - if these decisions are made in a nonarbitrary and reasonable way with appropriate faculty participation, then nothing at all will insulate adversely affected
individuals from the hard prospect of unemployment.
Tenure, then, neither buttons up the process of institutional change nor binds the ways which each institution
must consider as it copes with authentic financial distress.
It is but a limited statement that each faculty member
possessing it, receiving it only after a stipulated period of
probationary service, is thought worthy of a rebuttable
presumption of professional excellence in continuing
service to the institution. Thereafter, when termination
of his services is sought for any reason inconsistent with
that presumption, it requires only that the burden of
justification be fairly discharged under conditions of academic due process by those with whom it properly rests.
To the extent that tenure protections of full academic
due process possess a marked resemblance to the procedural rights of others not involved in higher education,
it is clear that tenure does contemplate an interest in
professional security quite apart from its central objective
to safeguard academic freedom. There is, moreover,
every good reason that it should do so entirely aside from
an intelligent concern to render higher education competitive with other employment opportunities by assuring
that it provides at least as much job security. The more
fundamental reason for the requirement of due process
here as elsewhere is the desire to do justice and to avoid
errors in the making of critical judgments. Even supposing that in many instances a particular charge of professional irresponsibility is neither stated in terms which
anyone would claim to raise a question of academic freedon (e.g., a charge that a faculty member has accepted
bribes in the award of grades) nor that the charge is
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otherwise suspected of having been brought forward
solely from an ulterior reason which itself relates to academic freedom, still the need would remain to protect the
individual from unreasonable risks of error and prejudice
in the resolution of that charge. The power to fire a
person without a fair hearing- in this instance a hearing
according to academic due process- deserves to be called
"arbitrary" and to be despised, not so much on its own
account as on account of its greater tendency to result
in error- to yield a result utterly at odds with what we
would have desired had the actual facts been known.
On such a basis, we find no difficulty in understanding
why an individual may not be made even to pay a fine for
drunk driving in the absence of a right to fair trial which
yields a civilized assurance that he did in fact violate the
law. Protection of a professor from the unjust forfeiture
of his position after a long period of service to the institution is surely as simple a thing to understand, and thus
the appropriateness of furnishing that protection through
the assurance of academic due process without regard to
the nature of the charge.
Nevertheless, beyond the consideration of justice itself,
it is still extremely important to understand the special
relationship of tenure to academic freedom in particular.
An understanding of this relationship would be worthwhile
in any case, given the fact that the vast majority of contested dismissals continue to involve disputes over whether
what the individual may have done is part of his academic
freedom (e.g., how he discharges his duties, what he has
said about the college, whether his extramural utterances
are defensible within his discipline), and many others have
arisen under circumstances involving the suspicion of
ulterior purpose in bringing the charge- a purpose itself
believed to violate academic freedom. Essentially, however, the connection of tenure with academic freedom is
important to understand so as to account for the particular
form of due process to which tenure creates an entitlement, namely, full academic due process with its emphasis upon professional peer-group participation in the
first instance.
The function of tenure is not only to encourage the
development of specialized learning and professional
expertise by providing a reasonable assurance against the
dispiriting risk of summary termination; it is to maximize
the freedom of the professional scholar and teacher to
benefit society through the innovation and dissemination
of perspectives and discoveries aided by his investigations, without fear that he must accommodate his honest
perspectives to the conventional wisdom. The point is
as old as Galileo and, indeed, as new as Arthur Jensen.
An individual who is subject to termination without
showing of professional irresponsibility, irrespective of
the long term of his service within his discipline, will
to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own perspectives and take from all of us that which we might
more usefully confront and consider. Exactly as his skill
and understanding advance to a point making it more
likely than before that he will contribute something to the
legacy of past endeavors, exactly as he will have made
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an extended commitment in one given discipline diminishing his opportunities to do something else with his life or
to start all over again in a wholly different kind of career,
so the larger society will tend to be deprived of whatever
he would have had to offer it by the very degree of
chilling inhibition which it would impose through upholding institutional authority to dismiss him without full
academic due process. It is the most vital function of
tenure to avoid this contingency by shifting the benefit of
doubt to the individual, entitling him then to full academic due process.
The shift does, indeed, do more than to provide a fair
hearing in the usual sense, i.e., a full hearing before disinterested parties, preceded by a statement of specific
charges based upon reasonably clear standards. Rather,
full academic due process locates the fulcrum of responsibility to determine in the first instance whether the
tenured professor's work is professionally defensible in
those with whom the risk of abuse may least dangerously
be placed, namely, his professional peers.
The matter can be fairly expressed only in this way
(i.e., "with whom the risk of abuse may least dangerously
be placed"), for it is true of course that there are degrees
of intolerance and convention regarding the methodology
and premises of "professionally responsible" utterances
within academic peer groups as outside of them. Faculty
committees are doubtless capable of reacting against a
colleague when others would not have done so, or of
favoring him when others would not have done so, and
either of these may be accomplished on occasion by
means against which no system can be 100 per cent foolproof. Given the necessary decision that there must be
accountability somewhere, according to some standard, as
initially reviewed by some group of human beings, however, the alternatives to initial peer-group hearing all seem
worse where academic freedom tends so frequently to be
at stake. At the same time, the entitlement of tenure to
full academic due process with its emphasis upon initial
peer-group hearing is not without significant checks and
balances and by no means reposes final adjudicative authority within the faculty. Rather, it is characteristically
hedged about by the reserved authority of the university
president and trustees to reverse a judgment or to modify
a sanction either favoring or disfavoring the individual,
for compelling reasons and following fair review with
him and with the faculty committee which initially considered the case.1
The sense and system of tenure, in summary, come
down to this. After completing the full profile of professional preparation, an individual appointed to the faculty
of an institution for the first time is neither assured of
1 A better alternativeto this system is by no means obvious.
Indeed, a number of alternatives were canvassed again early
this year, in a comprehensivereport at the University of Utah,
by a Commission including among its members students and
citizens from outside the institution. Two-thirds through that
Commission'sReport (the text of which appears elsewhere in
this issue), the first recommendationappears:
Recommendation No. 1: The tenure system at the
University of Utah should be maintained.

AAUP BULLETIN

lifetime employment, nor is he assured of employment
beyond the initial term on some general condition of good
behavior, nor is he even presumed to be professionally
excellent according to the institution's own standards of
faculty excellence. Rather, the immediate premise of his
appointment is extremely limited, i.e., that he is appointed
because he appears to be attractive and to meet certain
needs better than others at the time, with only the assurance that he will not be fired without cause during the
specified term of his initial appointment and that he will
be given a fair chance to establish his excellence over a
period of six years assuming, further, that the institution
does not in the meantime find others whom it thinks may
show greater promise or otherwise better meet its needs
then he. If the institution so resolves its policy clearly,
to "play the field" and to displace a nontenured appointee
by appointing someone else it subsequently finds has
become available and whom it regards as more attractive,
it is free to do so at least if it has fairly articulated this
prerogative and provides notice of and intention to exercise it, reasonably in advance of the end of a given probationary term.
Even assuming the necessity of this sort of rugged competition arrangement to assure each institution of flexibility of choice and an opportunity to resolve the excellence of its newer staff, however, it is surely clear that
six years of experience with the faculty member's fulltime professional service will provide the institution with
ample opportunity to judge his fitness according to the
standards and means of review it has established. The
institution thus may not further postpone resolving
whether that faculty member is now worthy of a conditional statement of continuing confidence, given the
intrinsic unfairness of an ever-increasing degree of specialization and dependence on his part under circumstances where a qualified judgment respecting his fitness is
clearly feasible and where a failure to resolve that judgment must continue to trammel both his personal security
and his academic freedom.
Indeed, throughout his probationary terms of service
the academic freedom of the appointee will necessarily
have been more constrained than that of others, given the
fact that he has continued to face the prospect of nonrenewal without a demonstration of adequate cause pursuant to full academic due process. The degree of dampening effect upon his academic and personal freedom has
been justifiable during this time, moreover, solely on the
basis that an initial appointment with "instant tenure"
would have been premature and reckless, i.e., it would
have expressed a statement of confidence in the demonstrated excellence of the appointee when no such statement could intelligently be made in the absence of a
reasonable opportunity to determine whether it is
warranted.
Temporizing beyond six years of experience can
scarcely be rationalized on such a basis, however, and
thus the institution is fairly called upon carefully to decide
by that time whether a conditional statement of continuing confidence is warranted- a statement of tenure. If,
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upon adequate consideration, the conclusion is reached
that no such statement is in fact warranted, the institution
must so advise him and put an end to uncertainty by
making the seventh year terminal. Otherwise, it must
extend to him the benefit of the doubt for the first time,
equally ending the uncertain cycle of term appointments.
Thereafter, while never assured that he will not fall
casualty to some contingency of programmatic change
in the institution or to some hard decision reflecting a
financial crisis without available alternatives, he at least
need not fear that he may be dispossessed of his position
in the absence of demonstrated adequate cause pursuant
to a hearing by his peers and the forms of fair review by
the administration of his institution. So very far is this
arrangement from being well calculated to establish lifetime employment, to protect the incompetent, or to conceal the irresponsible, and so mild are its features in the
encouragement of professional excellence and the protection of academic freedom, I cannot think it needs
defending at all. To the extent that it may, however, a
defense was well and succinctly stated in the following
resolution adopted by the 1971 Annual Meeting of the
AAUP:
Misconceptions of tenure are commonplace. For many
groups and individuals tenure has become a conveniently
simple explanation for what they perceive as a variety of
educational ills. Tenure is not the cause of these ills, nor is
it an incidental and self-serving privilege of the academic
profession which may be casually dismissed. It is the foundation of intellectual freedom in American colleges and
universities and has important but frequently overlooked
benefits for society at large.
Basically tenure insures that faculty members will not be
dismissed without adequate cause and without due process.
From the long list of academic freedom and tenure cases
with which the Association has been confronted, it is evident that many good teachers and scholars have been
arbitrarilydismissed, and that many more would have been
dismissed without the protection of tenure. In the absence
of a manifestly more effective means for safeguardingintellectual freedom, attacks on tenure are irresponsible. Therefore, the Fifty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American
Association of University Professors reaffirmsthe Association's commitment to tenure and insists upon its centrality
as an enabling principle of American higher education.

and the
Freedom
Academic
III.A LengthyPostscript:
Nontenured
Faculty
While the need to enter a defense of tenure against
the criticism that it is a shield for the incompetent and
irresponsible may melt away once the actual conditions
and terms of tenure have again been clarified, it may
nonetheless be appropriate to add a postscript in acknowledgment of a very different kind of criticism, a criticism
which finds serious fault with what is apparently the
anomaly of tenure and the equal protection of academic
freedom. In essence, the criticism is that insofar as the
case for tenure stands or falls according to the measure of
protection it yields for academic freedom, either it must
be extended equally to all faculty members irrespective of
their length of service, or withdrawn equally from all,
(possibly then to be replaced by a uniform standard of
academic due process for all, but without the invidious
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distinction implied by the term of "tenure" itself) . If it is
said that academic freedom is realistically secure for each
person only to the extent that his professional status may
not be placed in question without the observance of full
academic due process, and if it is acknowledged that only
those with tenure are entitled to full academic due
process, then it necessarily follows that only those with
tenure do in fact have academic freedom. On the other
hand, if it is claimed that all members of a faculty are
equally entitled to the free exercise of academic freedom,
then it must be acknowledged either that tenure itself is
not truly regarded as indispensable to the protection of
that freedom or, if it is regarded as indispensable, that it
must be provided for all alike. In short, the alleged equation that academic freedom = no termination without full
academic due process = tenure, proves too much or too
little. The anomalous combination of mutually exclusive
assertions, "equal academic freedom for all, but tenure
only for some," displays all the unseemliness of a motto
from Animal Farm: all teachers are equal in their academic freedom, but some teachers are more equal than
others (viz., those with tenure)!
It will not do, as a response to this criticism, merely to
point out that nontenured faculty members are equally
entitled to full academic due process if sought to be dismissed within the specified term of their appointment.
I.e., it is not enough that newer appointees do in fact have
"tenure" within their particular one-, two-, or three-year
terms, and that any action to dismiss them within that
term must be taken solely on the basis of adequate cause
as demonstrated pursuant to full academic due process.
The fact remains that the anxiety of prospective nonrenewal may be seen to chill the appointee's academic
freedom in a manner unequalled for those members of the
faculty with tenure.
Nor will it do quixotically to deny on second thought
that tenure is really wholly unconcerned with academic
freedom and that it is, rather, defended solely on the basis
that it provides an appropriate degree of professional
security for those of demonstrated excellence, i.e., those
who weathered an uncertain career (and kept their
mouths shut) as probationary appointees for as long as
six years and were found on the basis of experience to
warrant a conditional expression of institutional confidence in their continuing excellence. Other kinds of incentives than tenure might satisfy the need for perquisites
for the senior faculty, although possibly not so cheaply.
Rather, it may help to dissolve the dilemma first to note
that while there is a difference in the degree of academic
due process which tenure provides as compared with that
to which a person lacking tenure is entitled when confronted with the prospect that his term appointment may
not be renewed, the difference is not at all one of "full"
academic due process vis-a-vis "no" academic due
process. Indeed, recent developments in the federal courts
as well as the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards
in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments
provide for substantial due process in cases of proposed
nonrenewal. The differences of degree between the two
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forms of academic due process are, in fact, essentially
these:
1. Proceedings to dismiss one with tenure must be initiated by the employing institution, whereas proceedingsto
avoid termination of one lacking tenure who has received
notice that nonrenewal is contemplatedmust be initiated by
him;
2. The burden of proving the existence of adequate
cause is upon the institution in proceedings to dismiss one
with tenure, whereas the burden is upon the individualcontesting notice of nonrenewal to establish at least a prima
facie case either that reasons violative of academic freedom
contributedto the proposed decision or that adequate considerationwas not given to the merits of his reappointment;
3. The degree of formality in the total procedure is
somewhat heavier in the case of one with tenure faced with
dismissal than one without tenure faced with nonrenewal.
Recognizing, then, that those in probationary service
are assured of full academic due process against the contingency of dismissal within any term of their appointment and that they are also assured of at least minimal
due process against the contingency even of nonrenewal,
the disparity which remains as between themselves and
those with tenure is clearly not so great as first it may
have appeared. To the extent that it is nonetheless an
important difference, especially as it may weigh upon the
exercise of academic freedom, an explanation may rest
largely in the following considerations.
First, other things being even roughly equal, the degree
of hardship to one threatened with dismissal after an
extended commitment to a given discipline and a longer
period of service in a particular institution is likely to be
greater than to a younger person subject to nonrenewal
after a more tentative commitment and a briefer period
of service. To the extent that the degree of due process is
appropriately graduated to the degree of hardship which
may result from the decision in question, it is not difficult
to understand on that basis alone why dismissal proceedings are accompanied by a fuller complement of academic due process than those concerning nonrenewal.
Similarly, exactly to the extent that dismissal is more portentous than nonrenewal, the chilling effect on the individual's exercise of academic freedom may itself also be
greater. Correspondingly, merely to insure that the same
degree of academic freedom is assured equally to the
individual faced with the threat of dismissal as to the one
faced with the prospect of nonrenewal, a more deliberate
form of academic due process may be required in the first
case than in the second.
Second, there is simply no basis to hold that the fact
of one's first or second short-term appointment in teaching necessarily manifests an institutional presumption of
excellence which it would thereafter be the burden of the
institution to overthrow when contemplating nonrenewal
at the end of the term. Surely no institution ought to be
held to have made a judgment about the long-term professional excellence of a first-time appointee to its faculty
in view of the fact that frequently the appointment will
represent the individual's first experience in teaching and
there will have been no reasonable opportunity in fact
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so to determine his professional fitness. It is precisely the
purpose of having a probationary period to enable the
institution to resolve the doubt not previously resolved by
actions of the individual with whom the burden necessarily rests. To extend the presumption of professional
fitness back to the point of initial appointment is to be
unfair toward the institution's capacity to make a judgment on the matter so early, with all the deleterious
consequences of granting "instant tenure.'* Similarly, to
extend the assurance of full academic due process back
to the time of renewal of the first appointment is functionally exactly that, i.e., the establishment of instant
tenure.
Third, as initial appointments are usually not made
with an adequate basis for assessing the individual's longterm excellence, there is correspondingly less reason to
suspect that a decision not to renew such an appointment
is made on grounds unrelated to a reasonable belief about
that excellence. The same obviously cannot be said of
those who have been found by lengthy experience to be
satisfactory, however, and correspondingly their proposed
termination creates a greater suspicion that ulterior reasons (i.e., reasons violative of academic freedom) are
more likely to be operating, thereby providing an appropriate reason for requiring fuller academic due process
as a prerequisite to their termination. Stated in another
way, as between the two groups a higher rate of nonrenewal is less suspicious with respect to the first group

AUTUMN 1971

than with respect to the second and, correspondingly,
incurring the higher costs of more ponderous full academic due process is less warranted by the uniform
concern for academic freedom.
Fourth, as it is normally to be expected that one may
become more expert in his specialty the greater amount of
time and experience he will have devoted to it, the more
important it becomes not to permit the public value of
his academic freedom to be circumscribed precisely as he
becomes more likely to make an original contribution by
what he proposes to do or to say. Correspondingly, the
degree of full academic due process which protects his
academic freedom is more nearly likely to be worth its
cost than were it uniformly available to all irrespective of
their length of experience. To this extent, the earlier
suggestion that tenure does reflect an attitude that greater
academic freedom is warranted for those with a longer
commitment within their discipline than for those with
a relatively new one, is not without a basis in fact. Some
may well question whether the degree of difference is
really justifiable on such a basis, of course, reasonably
suggesting that what is lost to the younger teacher in lack
of seasoning and familiarity with his subject is more than
offset by his freshness, creativity, or lack of debilitating
conventionality. Perhaps the debate may rest there, at
least for the moment: not on whether tenure, with its
assurance of full academic due process should exist at all,
but rather on when it should appropriately be conferred!
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